לבישת בגדי שבת ויו"ט בפורים

There is a widespread custom (especially among children for whom so doing is age-appropriate) to wear costumes on פורים [1]. A less-known, though significantly better-sourced, custom is to wear בגדי שבת ויו"ט [2], as befitting the dignity of a festive occasion. The רמא brings this custom in שו"ע [3] as the correct one. It is also brought להלכה in [4] ערוה"ש and מ"ב [5].

כף החיים, in addition to bringing this custom להלכה, specifies that festive clothing should be worn ליל פורים as well as יום פורים [6].

[1] There are those who claim that the practice of פורים costumes actually has idolatrous origins. See here and draw your own conclusions.

[2] מהריל הלכות פורים אות יב

[3]  או"ח תרצה:ב

[4] שם סעיף ז

[5] שם ס"ק ג

[6] שם אות יג

בהדי כבשי דרחמנא למה לך

In our last post we discussed one the first responses I received to the letters I wrote to various prominent תלמידי חכמים. Another prominent rabbi (who shall remain unnamed) responded to me in a very terse letter with the following phrase borrowed from the literature of חזל (ברכות י.):

בהדי כבשי דרחמנא למה לך?

This means that I was being criticized for contemplating the mysterious ways of God, instead of simply minding my own business.

While I did not actually respond to the rabbi in question, as I did not gauge him to be looking for an answer but rather only asking rhetorically, I will yet take the liberty of responding here, as some of my readers may be wondering the same thing. Additionally, I believe it is generally wise to think through why I am taking a particular intellectual path, and what objections may potentially be raised against my thought process.

The brief answer is that I am not simply engaging in lofty theoretical speculation as to the nature of God and his Divine ways; rather, there is a מצוה to be done. Yet, at the same time, there were those who were Divinely prevented from carrying out said מצוה. Our goal is only to try figuring out what said prevention depends on. Once we figure out what said prevention depends on, we can then figure out under what circumstances the מצוה can indeed be performed.

Additionally, the original context of that statement is ישעיה criticizing חזקיה for not getting married because חזקיה saw (through רוה"ק) that his offspring would be wicked (as indeed his son מנשה turned out to be). ישעיה was telling חזקיה that what sort of offspring he would or would not have were not necessarily his business; rather, there is a מצוה to be done, namely that of having children, and חשבונות, however valid they may be, should be not be allowed in the way.

We see from this episode that contemplating the mysterious ways of Heaven should not get in the way of doing a מצוה. Here, however, the exact opposite would be true! If we successfully figure out a satisfactory answer to our puzzle, then we could potentially figure out how to actually perform a מצוה!

Now, normally I hesitate to outright disagree with a scholar of higher rank than myself (as this rabbi is). The most I would do, under ordinary circumstances, is respectfully point out any difficulties I had with halachic reasoning they offered. Here, however, I feel safe to disagree considering of the dozens (literally) of rabbis with whom I have discussed this issue (some of whom actually had an answer to my question; but even those who didn't), not a single one of them besides for this one criticized me for thinking about such matters in the first place (which perhaps would even make this rabbi a דעת יחיד whom I can freely and in good conscience choose not to follow).

לא בשמים היא

We have spent a considerable length of article space and intellectual energy analyzing all the possible reasons why ברכת כהנים should not be performed daily, and concluded (as has the ערוך השולחן, among other פוסקים [1]) that there is indeed no fully satisfying reason not to do so.

To that end, we wondered why it is that those who attempted to remedy this perplexing situation seem to have been punished (or at the very least stopped [2]) from doing so מן השמים.

We then spent another considerable length of article space and intellectual energy demonstrating that breaking an איסור to change מנהגים was not the reason. [3]

To this end, we must offer a counter-suggestion, which we will אי"ה do in forthcoming articles.

Here, however, we will address a different question, namely, why was it that, following the various tragedies that befell them, those who wanted to perform ברכת כהנים daily desisted from further attempts if, according to their (well-substantiated) halachic reasoning, they were doing the 'רצון ה?

The straightforward answer is that, by means of these signs from שמים, they were able to discern that attempting to reinstate daily ברכת כהנים was, indeed, not the 'רצון ה.

The problem is that there is a principle of לא בשמים היא, meaning that 'רצון ה as we are expected to fulfill it is not determined by signs from שמים, but rather by means of the halachic process!-?- [4]

ר יעקב Shapiro (rabbi emeritus, Bais Medrash of Bayswater) answered me in a letter that, indeed, we ordinarily would not pay much attention to signs from שמים, which is why, גופא, these particular signs from שמים manifested themselves in the form of a סכנה: once there is a סכנה, we perforce are no longer able to do whatever it is that שמים is displeased with, even where we otherwise would have based on the halachic process.

In future articles we will בעז"ה explore different approaches with regard to the primary question of why, indeed, would 'ה be displeased with our attempted performance of a מצוה.

Addendum

There is a rather obvious, glaringly troublesome point in that how can we simply disregard that which שמים i.e. הקב"ה tells us, implying that ח"ו we just don't care. -?-

While the plain פשט is that this גופא is a clause within the תורה that the תורה itself allows us, nay, enjoins us, to decide the הלכה for ourselves. That being the case, we are not allowed to reckon very strongly, if at all, with what שמים has to say post-מתן תורה because that would impede the halachic process from functioning normally. We humans must train our minds to the best of our ability in the push-and-pull of halachic reasoning to the best of our ability and, once we do so, it up to us exclusively and entirely to decide correct halachic behavior. [5]

That being said, there is another fascinating approach put forth by R David Nieto in his מטה דן (כוזרי שני) [6]. R Nieto is addressing why it is that we don't pay attention to Heavenly Voices in general, as well as, specifically, why it is not considered a חוצפה to ignore שמים. -?-

He answers (very originally) that there was no חוצפה in disregarding a בת קול, because maybe there is no actual בת קול but rather only a trickster on the roof of a building (or some other high place) that is making his voice sound like a בת קול by using a locutory tube (!). [7]

[1]

או"ח קכח:סד

ר יעקב Shapiro pointed out to me in a letter that these tragedies were not specifically a punishment but rather a sign from שמים that 'ה, for whatever reason, apparently does not want the מנהג to be changed. This is מדויק, he continues, from the language of the ערוה"ש which writes that there was "like a בת קול" revealing what the 'רצון ה was in that particular instance.

[3] In Yeshivos they say over from R Chaim Brisker that first one must learn what not to say, at which point one can then learn what yes to say.

[4] See :ב"מ נט from where we see that הקב"ה gave the right and responsibility to decide halachic matters to the חכמי הדור. See also the first explanation in פתח עינים שם ד"ה לא בשמים היא. 

This was ר ישראל Salanter's קשא, though, were he not to have asked it, we would have been compelled to ask it ourselves.

The only exception to this rule of disregarding a Heavenly Voice in favor of halachic reasoning is the instance of normative הלכה generally following בית הלל over בית שמאי. The reason for this exception is that בית הלל was the more numerous group, so essentially the בת קול is only telling us to follow the majority, which is anyway a halachic imperative. But where a בת קול tells us to follow a minority against a majority, which would run counter to normative halachic practice (only that בית שמאי were sharper, so there was a ה"א that we should follow them). See ריטבא עירובין ז. ד"ה ר יהושע היא דאמר אין  משגיחין בבת קול וע"ע מהרם שם.

Similarly (-ed.), where a sign from שמים tells us to contravene established halachic principles, as it does here, we ought, theoretically, to disregard it. Hence our difficulty.

[5] based on דרשות הרן ה:מב; שם ז:י, יג; שם יא:כא-כב, כה

[6] ויכוח רביעי רצג-ש

מטה ד"ן {דוד ניטו} was written as a sequel the the Kuzari of ר יהודה הלוי in that the original Kuzari focused primarily proving, among other things, the validity of תורה שבכתב. R Nieto wrote his work proving, primarily, the validity of תורה שבעל פה, ostensibly against the Karaites. Considering, however, that there were really no Karaites in 18th century England, one suspects he was using Karaites as a cover for his real target, namely former Marranos who had difficulty accepting the authority of an Oral Tradition they knew little about.

See שו"ת חכם צבי סי' יח for a defense of R Nieto's position on Nature and השגחה פרטית. Note, particularly, the complimentary language used by the חכם צבי in reference to R Nieto.

[7] This is the English translation of the Latin tuba locutoria that R Nieto references.

If someone else were to suggest such an interesting approach, they would likely be viewed as odd, but considering that R Nieto was called a חכם כולל מרומם ונעלה and told יישר כחו וחילו by the חכם צבי (see above note 5), I figure it is worth mentioning here.

It seems, though this point is not entirely clear, that רבי יהושע was indeed able to tell the difference between a real בת קול and an imitation thereof. Us mere mortals, on the other hand, may not be able to, to which end we may not regard any בת קול at all. According to that line of reasoning, however, perhaps there could instead have been some type of גזירה at some later point to that effect once people would no longer be able to tell the difference. On the other hand, however, perhaps this story גופא was an illustration of the existence of said גזירה to begin with, וצ"ע.

More instances, throughout halachic history, of where מנהגים were changed

Introduction

Some claim that the reason why those who tried to reinstate daily ברכת כהנים were stopped משמים from doing so was because they tried to change a מנהג, which is inherently wrong, as מנהגים are never supposed to be changed, period.

We countered that there are numerous places throughout halachic literature where פוסקים say to change or stop a given מנהג. The response to that was that it is one thing to write in a ספר that a מנהג should be changed or stopped; it is quite another to actually go about proactively changing it. Meaning, to write in a ספר to change a מנהג is fine; whereas to actually heed the ספר's words is wrong.

There are two problems with this response: one, that this relegates the דברי הפוסקים to being להלכה ולא למעשה, a bold assertion that doesn't make sense at its face, as this is not what they say; second, it suggests that פוסקים are not to be considered the guides and determinants of our religious behavior, but rather that they are to be ignored where they decide that what people do is wrong - in other words, פוסקים are very nice and all, but if they actually tell me to do something different than what I have always been doing until now (after all, I can't be - gasp - wrong) then we are religiously duty-bound to disregard them. [1]

However, with all that being said, we still attempted to provide instances, throughout halachic history, of where מנהגים were changed, using the מנהגים of ישיבה תורה ודעת as an excellent sample case of a set of מנהגים undergoing multiple changes throughout its century-long history. We did so just in the interest of thoroughness.

But apparently this was not enough, as some countered that perhaps ישיבה תורה ודעת is an exception in this regard being that their מנהגים, as a category, were fluid to begin with; and that, normally, changing a מנהג would never be tolerated.

To this end, we present of a number of other instances, throughout halachic history, of where מנהגים were changed. We focus particularly (though not exclusively) on communities whose מנהגים are, generally speaking, fixed and unchanging.

1

There was, at one point, a מנהג to stand trees in shul on שבועות, in honor of the fact that שבועות is the יום הדין for tree fruits. (This is in contradistinction to the מנהג of decorating shuls with flowers and grasses which I hope to discuss at another opportunity.) The גרא stopped this מנהג because it resembled how gentiles celebrate some of their festivals. [2]

2

The אריזל made many changes to the text of תפלה (whether directly or through the influence of his teachings and students; many of these changes are absent in the Spanish-Portuguese rite: see here). Being that he was ספרדי, the text with which he was working was the basic ספרדי text. To this end, the early Chassidic Masters, who were working with נוסח אשכנז as a base text, created נוסח ספרד/נוסח ארי to move נוסח אשכנז closer in line to the אריזל's Kabbalistic teachings. [3]

3

The old מנהג אשכנז did not include יזכור. R Samson Raphael Hirsch introduced its recitation on יו"כ. Following the Holocaust, Rav Joseph Breuer instituted the saying of יזכור on יו"ט as well. [4]

4

It used to be common for Western European clergy to wear clerical robes. (These are still universally worn by Spanish-Portuguese clergy.) This was done in Frankfurt by R Hirsch as well. In America, however, clerical garb is largely unknown. As such, no clergy in the Kehilloh have worn them since its transplantation to these shores. [4]

5

Originally, אנעים זמירות was sung at Congregation Shomrei Torah at the end of the שבת and יו"ט davening, followed by שיר של יום. This was changed to follow חזרת השץ of שחרית, because, as a result of its being positioned at the conclusion of the davening, people would not be taking that section of davening seriously; rather, they were already folding up their טליתים and one foot out the door to the קידוש. Once that section of the service was repositioned to an earlier point in the order of services, it could then be performed decorously, as it should be.

6

There is an old Spanish-Portuguese מנהג to say an abridged form of סליחות immediately following מעריב during the High Holyday season, in addition to those that are said in the morning. This מנהג has recently been discontinued in London, as part of an effort to bring the community more in line with קבלה-observant communities, who object to saying סליחות before midnight, before which is not considered to be an עת רצון [5].

7

There was an oral tradition in the London ספרדי community that the High Holyday קדיש is sung only on the first night (and both days) of ראש השנה, but not the second night. This is probably due to some important Minister (rabbi/Hazzan) having forgotten to sing it on the second night one year, as there is no inherent logical reason for the מנהג to be such. (Indeed in other Spanish-Portuguese communities the High Holyday קדיש is sung on both nights.) During R Jonathan Cohen's time as Visiting Rabbi of Bevis Marks, he was particular to sing the High Holyday קדיש on the second night as well, thereby changing the then-current מנהג (which didn't make sense) to reinstate (what was presumably) the old מנהג (which made sense). [6]

8

Many ספרדי congregations had a מנהג to sing פיוטים between ישתבח and the חצי קדיש before ברכו on ר"ה. In many Eastern as well as ירושלמי congregations these have been moved, based on the פסק of חכם עובדיה יוסף, to follow חזרת השץ of שחרית, so as not to interrupt the halachic flow of the תפלה [6].

9

About 10 years ago, ר אהרן Schechter instituted in Chaim Berlin that the גבאי should wear a טלית during קריאת התורה (if he wasn't wearing one already) [7].

10

The old מנהג in Chaim Berlin was that מוסף on שמחת תורה took place immediately following שחרית. Everyone would then go home for their סעודת יו"ט, only to return for מנחה גדולה followed by הקפות. R Shloima Halioua changed the procedure to be that a קידוש is offered immediately following שחרית, which would then be followed by הקפות and מוסף.

מנחה would then take place later in the afternoon, closer to שקיעה, followed by נעילת החג and מעריב [8].

11

שחרית on שבת in Chaim Berlin used to take place at 8:30. ר אהרן Schechter, in consultation with a few VIPs, changed it to 8:00, thereby (nearly always) making the earlier סוף זמן קריאת שמע [9].

12

There is a חצי קדיש before מוסף. This חצי קדיש 'belongs' to the אשרי preceding it. With the exception of the texts that are said/sung as the ספר תורה is being returned to the ארון, all else would be deemed a הפסק. To this end, where R Joseph Hirsch Dunner became a rabbi in Koenigsberg he changed the מנהג to be that wherever he spoke (which was not every week but rather only on special occasions) the ספר תורה would be returned to the ארון, he would speak, followed by אשרי and חצי קדיש, as opposed to speaking between the ספר תורה being returned to the ארון and חצי קדיש, which would seem to have been the practice of the previous rabbis. [10]

13

There was one year where R Hirsch, as a rabbi in Oldenburg, canceled כל נדרי (!). The reason for this was because he felt that, as a result of a very superficial understanding of כל נדרי on the part of the  populace, people were taking their promises very lightly. To this end, he canceled its recitation one year, to emphasize the point that one's word is not to be taken lightly and that all the כל נדרי in the world cannot undo a solemn promise. [11]

14

R Hirsch, upon taking the helm of Khal Adath Jeshurun (which was a reincarnation of the old Frankfurt Kehilloh that had been usurped by Reform), made a number of changes from the מנהגים of the old Kehilloh, such as the introduction of a choir, and the recitation of קבלת שבת by the entire congregation instead of by only a small group known as the חברה מקבלי שבת [11].

15

Congregation Shearith Israel used to hang their מנורה (or חנוכיה in its proper title) in a box on the wall, which is the way it was done in ספרדי homes and synagogues for centuries. In 2005, renovations were done to their building, and it was decided that the חנוכיה should thereon be set up on a table, so as to avoid a fire hazard, as well as a potentiality of the walls being dirtied. [12]

16

I do not consider myself to be the dust of the feet of our great Rabbinical Leaders, but, in my own shul, I used to sing יציב פתגם in middle of the הפטורה on the second day of שבועות. Last year I became aware that this is a הפסק, to which end I changed the מנהג to be that יציב פתגם is sung after the עולה is called for מפטיר.

Conclusion

We have brought a number of examples above of where מנהגים were proactively changed, from top-down, by halachic authorities (or as a result of their halachic rulings). This goes to show changing a מנהג is not, as a concept, foreign to the halachic process.

Additionally, in none of these instances (as far as I am aware) did any tragedy occur as a result of the מנהג being changed. This being the case, it does not make sense to say that those who attempted to reinstate daily ברכת כהנים were stopped because they changed a מנהג. This cannot be what it is תלוי on, if not all who change מנהגים are stopped from doing so. Rather, there must be some other factor involved.

We will discuss other approaches to this problem in future articles בעז"ה.

Postscript

Aside from all the aforementioned precedents, it only makes sense that there should be some mechanism to alter what is viewed by rabbinic (and other) authorities as a practice that is incorrect, obsolete, or needing of improvement. It is unconscionable to the rational mind that people should be assumed to have perfect halachic behavior being, as they are, imperfect. This being the case, there must be some device to be able to change normative halachic practice, else we may end up mistakenly doing everything that is objectively wrong without any way to know so.

Some may posit a live-and-let-live, laissez-faire approach of letting people just keep doing whatever they were doing until now for fear of upsetting the status quo by introducing change. If we take this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, then כל תורת משה כולה בטלה - the entire Torah ends up being irrelevant as there becomes no objectively correct or incorrect way of doing things according to the Will of the Almighty. The Torah mind considers that possibility to be unfathomable. [13]

[1] The only exception that may possibly be made is for Western European (both אשכנזי and ספרדי) Jews who have set tradition systems that were meticulously preserved for many generations, such that (some of) those traditions long predate the acceptance of the שולחן ערוך. As such, they may be entitled to contravene halachic principles where they have a specific tradition indicating otherwise, this being included in the מחבר's clause (see the הקדמה to בית יוסף) that his פסקים (and, by extension, those of the רמא and נושאי כלים) are not intended to be binding upon those who have a preexisting tradition. (Truth to be told, however, even in those communities there are instances of מנהגים being changed, some of which are documented here.)

For all the rest of us mere mortals, however, who do not necessarily have iron-strong traditions in matters of religious behavior - we are religiously duty-bound to follow הלכה as expressed by those who possess the most expertise in הלכה - even if we are told by those experts that our halachic behavior needs to be improved.

[2] מ"ב תצד:י 

The גרא seems to assume that a practice can become אסור if adopted by gentiles for idolatrous purposes, even where we had it first. This שיטה is deserving of a fuller discussion which is beyond the scope of this article.

[3] See שו"ת חתם סופר או"ח סי כד-כה

[4] heard from Breuer's מתפללים

Normally the instituting of a new מנהג where no such מנהג existed previously would not fall under the category of changing a מנהג; in fact, the creation of a new מנהג would be lauded by those who are disinclined towards changing מנהגים. In Breuer's, however, the lack of a מנהג to say יזכור is actually a definite מנהג not to say יזכור, so, in effect, Rav Breuer was indeed changing the מנהג.

[5] https://sites.google.com/site/londonsephardiminhag/kabbalah-not

[6] https://sites.google.com/site/londonsephardimusic/rosh-hashanna; see שו"ת יחוה דעת חלק ב סי' יז

[7] While the institution of a new מנהג would not typically be included in this list - in Chaim Berlin, however (as in Breuer's - to which they have cultural similarities that I may, perhaps, discuss at a different point), the lack of a מנהג to do something is indication of a מנהג not to do something. For example, if, until that point, there was no מנהג that the גבאי should wear a טלית - this means that the מנהג was for the גבאי to not wear a טלית.

[8] This author was learning in the yeshiva at the time this change was made.

[9] As heard by this author from ר חיים Kitevits, a מגיד שיעור in the yeshiva

[10] מנהגי מהריץ הלוי - שבת פרק יז אות ב ועיי' בדינרי זהב שם. This example is especially valuable in that R Dunner was overturning the practice of the rabbis who came before him. Ordinarily, the הנהגה of learned individuals has significant value in determining correct halachic behavior; here, however, it seems that said הנהגה contravenes an explicit, clear halachic principle, in which case precedent seems to have had limited halachic bearing.

[11] Klugmann, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (ArtScroll, 1996) pg. 303-307

[12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-6URsi2T1Q, especially about 34:00

[13] This point is eloquently expressed by R Hirsch in his Collected Writings VI pgs. 35-36: "The Torah is a Law, a fiery Law, intended to permeate, inspire, enlighten, warm and shape every aspect of our existence, to penetrate every facet of our lives. No aspect of life, not even a moment of our activities, can do without it...We must let the Torah place its imprint on all our actions, shine as the diadem upon our heads, and we must adopt it as the motto of every aspect of our lives, private and public." See there at length.

גדר מנהג ישראל תורה

In a previous article, we offered a critical analysis of a popular סגולה for easy childbirth, namely to bite the פיטם of an אתרוג. Some responded to me that, although (as we showed there) this practice makes little sense and has little (if any) grounds in הלכה (and common sense), we should yet maintain this practice because of the principle of מנהג ישראל תורה.

In this article we cite a number of instances where this principle appears in halachic literature and see if this principle can reasonably be applied here as well or not.

1

There is an איסור to read documents on שבת. To this end, the בח prohibits a waiter from reading a list of guests at a meal. The מ"א [1] disagrees, saying that מנהג ישראל תורה and that חשבונות של מצוה are allowed.

2

בני יששכר has a lengthy מאמר on the מנהג of decorating ספרי תורה with flowers on שבועות, which he begins with the premise of מנהג ישראל תורה [2].

3

בני יששכר has a brief מאמר in which he explains the מנהג ישראל תורה of wearing costumes on פורים, based on המן's גזירה being a punishment for the Jews having bowed to נבוכדנצר's statue only prima facie; so too הקב"ה only "pretended" to make a גזירה. To this end, we wear costumes so that the identity of the wearer is only pretend. [3]

4

מטה אפרים brings a מנהג to make large candles that will stay lit the entire יו"כ on ערב יו"כ. There is an additional מנהג to daven while making the candles. מטה אפרים says not to make fun of or stop this מנהג, as מנהג ישראל is תורה [4].

5

פרי צדיק refers to eating fruits on טו בשבט as מנהג ישראל תורה [5].

6

האלף לך שלמה references מנהג ישראל תורה as a reason why he is opposed to machine מצה, namely because מנהג ישראל תורה that מצה is round, whereas machine מצה is square. [6]

7

לקוטי תורה has a lengthy Kabbalistic explanation as to why the מנהג ישראל תורה is not to dip מצה in salt, as one normally would do for their לחם משנה [7].

8

There were those who used to plant לולבים and הדסים in flowerpots in their homes. ערוה"ש offers halachic reasoning to the effect that these plantings were fit for use, followed by saying that מנהג ישראל תורה and people are behaving correctly. [8]

9

שפת אמת refers to חביטת הערבה as a מנהג ישראל תורה.

10

שפת אמת gives a lengthy and deep explanation as to the reason for פורים costumes, which he refers to as a מנהג ישראל תורה [10].

11

ערוה"ש observes that the ברכה on הפרשת חלה is להפריש חלה מן העיסה, as opposed to להפריש תרומה מן העיסה; and although it is not מעכב, still, מנהג ישראל תורה and, as such, the מנהג needs to be explained, which ערוה"ש immediately proceeds to do. [11]

12

בני יששכר gives a number of deeply kabbalistic reasons for various מנהגי אבלות that are practiced during ספירה, referring to them as מנהג ישראל תורה [12].

13

There are a number of מנהגים relating to the מוצאי שבת service for which various reasons are given. There are those who are מגמגם on these מנהגים; however, מנהג ישראל is תורה [13].

14

In general, the meaning of מנהג ישראל תורה is that there are lessons in יראת שמים and עבודה to be learned even from מנהגי ישראל, although they are not necessarily a חיוב originating in שס ופוסקים [14].

Conclusion

Nowhere (that I have found) is מנהג ישראל תורה used to mean, "there is a מנהג doesn't make any sense, but we should do it anyway, because מנהג ישראל תורה". Rather, the phrase is exclusively used to mean that while there is often no source for a particular מנהג in classical halachic and Talmudic reasoning, still, there is often an extra-halachic reason, such as a lesson to reinforce or the like, and, as such, the מנהג should still be kept.

Practically, this means that a מנהג that has a valid reason should be kept, even where it is not a חיוב per se, whereas a מנהג that does not make sense should not be kept. [15]

[1] שז:יז

[2] סיון ד:ז:א. This is brought down להלכה by כף החיים או"ח תצד:נט:א. See also בני יששכר סיון ד:ח:ה

[3] אדר ט:א. For an additional reason, see שם שם:ב:א

[4] תרג:ז

[5] לטו בשבט, ג:א

[6] השמטות לב, יא

[7] ויקרא ה, סו

[8] או"ח תרמה:כא

[9] דברים, לסוכות כב:ח; וע"ע שם טו:ד

[10] ויגש, ח:ו

[11] יו"ד שכח:ב

[12] ניסן יב:ח:א

[13] ערוה"ש או"ח רצה:א

[14] based on טעמי המנהגים תתעו:ד

[15] One may say that it doesn't hurt. Indeed, in Chelm they used to wear glasses without lenses because, after all, it doesn't hurt.

מנהג אכילת וופלים בחנוכה

Recently I discovered a מנהג to eat waffles on חנוכה. The origin of this מנהג is that 'ה made נס ופלא during these days. To this end, a מנהג developed in Amsterdam to eat vaffeles (Belgian waffles).

This מנהג was later mentioned in a song written by Moshe Yehuda Piza (see also here) which describes all the food-related מנהגים that are practiced throughout the year.

Sources:

https://www.shearithisrael.org/prayer/liturgy/minor-holidays/ (heading: Ahaba Be'taanugim)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zSqa0NL-FJo (at approx. 24 mins.)

Postscript: perhaps one can eat the waffles with dairy syrup or the like, thereby fulfilling both מנהגים at once.

נשיכת הפיטם כסגולה ללידה קלה

There is a מנהג that a woman who is expecting a child bites a פיטם as a סגולה for an easy childbirth. In this article we will present the source and reason behind this custom and examine its legitimacy.

The earliest source for this idea is the נזיר שמשון quoting a(n anonymous) manuscript, in which the following was written:

"Expectant women have a custom that on הושענא רבה (after their husbands return home from shul) to take [1] the פיטם of the אתרוג (the reason for this being that there is an opinion that the fruit of the עץ הדעת was an אתרוג [2]), and they give money to the poor so that הקב"ה should save them and their baby from death.

They then say the following תפלה:

רבון העולם בשביל חוה שהיא אכלה מעץ הדעת - אותו החטא הוא שגרם מיתה בעולם. ואם הייתי באותו מקום לא הייתי אוכלת ולא הייתי נהנית ממנו, כמו שלא רציתי לפסול אתרוג זה בשבעת ימי החג שעברו, והיום שפסלתי אין בו מצוה. וכשם שיש לי הנאה בפיטם זה כן הייתי נהנית לראות עץ הדעת שאמר הקב"ה לאדם וחוה שלא לאכול ממנו ולא הייתי עוברת את ציוויו, ותקבל ברצון את תפלתי ואת תחנתי שלא אמות מלידה זו. ותושיעני לילד בנחת ובלי צער, ולא יהיה שום נזק לי או לולדי כי אתה האל המושיע

Translation (mine):

Master of the World, because חוה ate from the עץ הדעת therefore death was caused to exist in the world. If I were in her place, I wouldn't have eaten or benefited from it, just as I did not want to פסל this אתרוג during the seven days of יו"ט that just passed by, and today that I did פסל it - there is no מצוה to be done with it anymore. And just as I have pleasure from [eating] this פיטם - so would I have had pleasure from [only] seeing the עץ הדעת that הקב"ה told אדם and חוה not to eat from; and I wouldn't have transgressed His command. In this merit You should accept my תפלה and תחנה - that I should not die from this birth - graciously. Please save me such that I can give birth easily, without pain, and that there shouldn't be harm to me or to my child - for You are the L-rd Who saves."

We will now proceed to enumerate a number of problems inherent in this מנהג:

1) In the original תפלה (found in אלף המגן תרס:ו), there are numerous grammatical mistakes and instances of faulty sentence structure (which I have edited out for easier reading).

2) While there is an opinion that the עץ הדעת was an אתרוג tree, this does not account at all for those opinions which disagreed [2]. Moreover, even if the עץ הדעת was an אתרוג tree, the connection between that fact and biting the פיטם - and not any other part of the fruit - is not entirely clear.

3) To assert that, had one been in חוה's place, one would not have partaken of the עץ הדעת is wildly presumptuous at the very least, and even seems to be full-blown גאוה and עזות; how any sane, rational person could sincerely believe such a statement is not clear.

4) The subject of the תפלה attempts to prove that they would not have committed the חטא עץ הדעת by showing that they did not פסל the אתרוג the entire יו"ט. This is ludicrous as there was no specific temptation to do so, in which case one has a difficult time indeed making this a line of advocacy on their own behalf.

5) The assertion that פסלing an אתרוג on הושענא רבה does not interfere with the מצוה is inaccurate, as the entire day one can still fulfill the מצוה, so the אתרוג still has a use at that point.

6) The subject asserts that she has pleasure from the פיטם. What pleasure is referred to here is unclear, as פיטם doesn't necessarily taste like anything in particular.

7) The assumption of the תפלה seems to be that death from childbirth is a frequent occurrence בר מנן. Today, however, this is not the case 'בחסדי ה.

8) In general, the entire category of סגולות is suspect, [3] as the psychology behind a סגולה is an attempt at forcing G-d's Hand. To this end, the only סגולות that certainly have authentic validity are those that are reliably sourced, which brings us to our next point: one may counter that this סגולה is found in אלף המגן, a reliable source of פסק הלכה.

דרכי חיים ושלום, however, [4] contends that this entire paragraph (which is, in fact, copy-pasted from חיים וברכה אות רכח quoting נזיר שמשון) did not appear in the early editions of אלף המגן, rather it seems to have crept in at some later point, in which case this סגולה does not carry the אלף המגן's stamp of approval.

Conclusion

Biting a פיטם as a סגולה for an easy childbirth would seem to be not much more than an old wives' tale that has no clear basis in הלכה ומנהג and, as such, should be frowned upon.

Appendix

There are those who countered to me, in my discussion of the topic with them, that מנהג ישראל תורה, and, as such, one should keep this (or any) מנהג even where it does not make sense. Although the entire premise of this claim is not palatable to the logical mind, we will בעז"ה address this important principle in a future article.

The information in this article was compiled with the research assistance of members of the Sofrim Google group for writers.

[1] While the specific instructions are only to take, rather than bite, the פיטם, presumably the purpose of taking the פיטם is to then eat it - as is evinced from the accompanying תפלה in which experiencing pleasure from the פיטם plays a role.

[2] בראשית רבה פרשה טו אות ז

[3] For more on this point, see here. Note: the sentiments or opinions held by that author (in that article and elsewhere) are solely his own; I am only מציין to that article specifically as it expresses my point clearly.

[4] אות תשצו. See also מקור חיים סי' תרסד who is also critical of this מנהג.